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Abstract
Interdisciplinary studies and cooperations are necessary for practical work as well as studies in geodesy. Respon-
sibility is a function of power, impact and knowledge. The more strategically central one’s position is in terms of
power, influence and knowledge, the higher one’s responsibility is. This is an idea which can be worked out in
more detail by using interdisciplinary approaches and distributive models on different levels. Social traps, Prison-
ers’ Dilemma situations etc. as pertaining to land, soil, and environment as well as some examples from geodesics
and the study of the usage of nature systems like lakes and flood plain areas are discussed regarding responsibil-
ity and distribution problems. “Naturalists’ Dilemmas” (or “Enjoyers’ Dilemmas”) are sketched and potentially
solved by proposing a viable distribution strategy.
1 Interdisciplinary studies
are necessary also
for geodesy, GISs etc.
Methodologically speaking and also in engineering
and planning practice different sorts of interdisci-
plinary cooperations seem to be conducive and even
necessary in geodesics as an earlier study (by Lenk
et al., 1998) hypothesized and partially substantiated.
In this preliminary article different kinds of interdis-
ciplinary cooperation were mentioned as being use-
ful in geodesy, notably for applying GIS models. We
sketched the application of some such cooperation
forms for examples of flood plain area management
problems in England. Here is a short introductory out-
line of the paper:
“A specific example project of an interdisciplinary in-
tegrated floodplain area development based on GIS
methods was used to highlight some of the modeling,
data acquisition and data integration problems as well
as the interdisciplinary function of GISs in this realm
of research and planning (theory).[. . . ]
There is a rather encompassing trend towards cross-
disciplinary systems in an ever more interlaced world
which is to a considerable part encroached on by
man. This development comprises complex sys-
temic trends getting ever more comprehensive im-
pact to manipulate and reshape if not revolutionize
our environment and the social world. We seem to
live in a rather “socio-technological”, largely man-
made systems-technological and thus in a sense “ar-
tificial(ized)” world.
Systems methods and methodologies prevail. This
trend is to be found in all science-induced technolog-
ical developments as well as in administrations. Be-
sides systems theory in the narrow sense the mentioned
methods are characterized by operations technologies
led by (methodical or even methodological) process
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controlling and systems engineering, by operations re-
search etc. Moreover, methodological assessment as
articulated in philosophy of science is necessary.
In general, digitalization, abstraction, formalization
and concentration on the operational procedures as ar-
ticulated is essential. It is by the way of computeri-
zation and informatization as well as by using of for-
mal and functional operations technologies (e. g. flow
charts, network approaches etc.) that the formal essen-
tials of increasingly comprehensive processes, organi-
zations as well as the interrelations of different fields
and subfields are integrated. Information technologies
lead the way.
For comprehensive systems engineering or system
technology, it is indeed characteristic that the different
technological developments including economic and
industrial changes lead to system(at)ic interaction and
generally to a kind of systems acceleration across dif-
ferent fields. (This is a trend which had been predicted
by Gottl-Ottlililienfeld (1923) in 1913. He had already
described mutually interactive spill-over effects, ram-
ifications across traditional realms and a sort of what
we nowadays would call positive feed-back processes.)
All these ongoing processes necessarily require a far-
reaching, if not encompassing interdisciplinary inter-
action and stimulation (inter-stimulation). Indeed, in-
terdisciplinarity led by spillovers from science to sci-
ence and from there to technological development and
innovation plus implementation as well as to society
at large is prominent nowadays. Systems analyses
and systems technologies require interdisciplinary ap-
proaches in practice. The pertinent challenges within
this world of systems including techno-systems (in
fact socio-technical systems combined with social and
ecosystems) requires a thorough methodological study
for the types of interdisciplinarity in research and de-
velopment and practise.
Short of providing such a methodological analysis
here, it may suffice just to mention that one has to
elaborate criteria for the methodological distinction of
disciplines according to the objects and areas as well
as scopes of the research, development and prospec-
tive implementation. Relevant (arsenals of) methods
and knowledge interests (Habermas) have to be articu-
lated and the relationship between theory and practice
should be studied. Methodologically important is the
difference between theories and their systematic and
historical connections and contexts, substantivity vs.
operationality of theories (substantive vs. operative or
procedural theories) (Bunge, 1967). One has to spec-
ify from a philosophy of science perspective the extant
patterns of explanation and systematization (descrip-
tive versus explanatory, historical versus systematical)
and questions of cognitivity and normativity (descrip-
tive versus normative approaches and practical combi-
nations).
These perspectives lead to different types of bi- and
multilateral interdisciplinary relationships between the
respective disciplines of these as, e. g., in GIS engi-
neering. Stages of the more or less strong, formal and
law-based interpenetration or merely aggregative coor-
dination are reflected in the following.
Types of Interdisciplinarity:
1) interdisciplinary co-operation in more or less well-
defined projects (e. g. GIS in geology)
2) bidisciplinary or interdisciplinary research area
(like satellite geodesy)
3) multidisciplinary aggregate field of research (e. g.
environmental research)
4) genuive interdiscipline (like physical chemistry or
biochemistry)
5) multidiscipline resulting from/relying on multidis-
ciplinary theoretical integration
6) abstract generalized interdisciplinary systems theo-
ries (e. g. general systems theory)
7) mathematical theories of abstract and complex dy-
namical systems (e. g. deterministic or an as yet
less developed probabilistic chaos theory)
8) supra-disciplinary abstract structure-analytic and
operational disciplines (e. g. operations research)
9) methodological supra-discipline as e. g. philosophy
of science and science of science
10) philosophical and methodological epistemology
as a meta-disciplinary approach (e. g., methodolog-
ical schema interpretationism, cf. Lenk (1993)).
At first, we have the co-operation of different experts
for or within a developmental programme, as e. g. in
a coastal zone management (CZM) planning where
experts from different fields like geography, cartog-
raphy, hydrography, geodesy, biology and ecology,
limnology or oceanography as well as engineering in
dike-building and landscape planning have cooper-
ated (cf. Lenk et al., 1998). Secondly, an interdisci-
plinary or bidisciplinary realm of research like satellite
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geodesy might evolve or, thirdly, even a multidisci-
plinary aggregative research area as, e. g., environ-
mental research (systematic ecology). The fourth level
or step of co-operative integration would amount to a
real interdiscipline (like molecular biology or popula-
tion genetics) or, fifthly, a multidiscipline in the more
specific sense (multidisciplinary theoretical integra-
tion) (for instance the integration of natural and social
science approaches in systems engineering of eco-
techno-sociosystems, e. g. diked areas and CZM. The
sixth through eighth levels are formal theories of an
abstract mathematical brand being used as instrumen-
tal vehicles of modeling real or constructed systems
- including approaches in Social Impact Analyses of
geosystems engineering. Furthermore, the metatheo-
retical levels 9 and 10 are addressed on a higher stage
of methodological or epistemological (meta-)analyses
(e. g. philosophical, social and methodological assess-
ments).
Interesting questions regarding GISs and their appli-
cation to CZM are:
a) On what level are actual and potential interdisci-
plinary co-operations in both of these fields to be
located?
b) How can possibly and already do levels and types
of interdisciplinary interact with one another?
c) Is it possible to distinguish and effectively sepa-
rate descriptive and normative, i. e. prescriptive or
(e)valuative, utilization of interdisciplinary model-
ing, e. g. with regard to factual (“cognitive”) and
interest or value conflicts, respectively?
d) Can we neatly distinguish between scientific and
purely descriptive analyses and evaluative ap-
proaches in the practice of systems planning, to wit,
e. g., coastal or shore zone management?
e) To what extent are values, goals and interests
(“humanware” so to say) indispensable moderat-
ing variables for any application of GISs and plan-
ning procedures, e. g. coastal management acts and
plans? [. . . ]
With respect to the evolved types or stages of interdis-
ciplinarity, we would hypothesize and argue that the
practical elaboration of GISs and the interdisciplinary
collaboration in landscape, land-use and coastal as well
as lake and river shore management have thus far not
progressed beyond step 3 as in the list of types of in-
terdisciplinarity above (if not only step 2) and will in
the foreseeable future hardly reach level 5 of a really
theoretical multidisciplinary integration. (This judge-
ment is based on the rather as yet underdeveloped stage
of the theoretical integration of natural and social sci-
ence approaches in general and notably with respect to
sociotechnological applications.) Yet, advancing inter-
disciplinary approaches in all of these mentioned fields
will turn out to be necessary for and conducive to prac-
tical applications in the near future.”
(End of passage paraphrased from Lenk et al. (1998))
2 Social traps, Prisoners’ Dilemma
situations etc. as pertaining to
land, soil, and environment
In economics and social science scholars speak of so-
cial traps, the externalities problem, side-effects, social
costs, the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and the public goods
problem. I would like to illustrate the problem first by
using the problem structure of the so-called “Tragedy
of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968). This constellation
can be understood as a prototype of a social trap. The
central question will turn out to be: Who would bear
the responsibility for an action result and for the re-
spective consequences which nobody had wanted or
intended beforehand?
According to Hardin every owner of stock in the Sahel
zone has an individual and perfectly legitimate inter-
est in utilizing and exploiting the common grassland,
the so-called “common”, which is indeed a collective
good. This individual interest is characterized by striv-
ing to have as much stock as possible, because the
greater one’s own stock, the higher is one’s social sta-
tus. All the owners and society in general, however,
have a common interest, a real commonality, namely to
avoid overgrazing of the commons. This constellation
of individual and common interests would lead to the
following dilemma: Because hardly anybody has suf-
ficient individual interest to avoid extensive exploita-
tion of the commons for one’s own good, everybody
will utilize it as extensively as possible. Therefore,
overgrazing of the commons would be the necessary
result. Consequently, in the last analysis the very sat-
isfaction of the individual interest would be barred or
ruined, respectively. Hardin thinks it necessary to have
social, i.e. not merely individual, mechanisms of con-
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trol, in order really to avoid such a dilemma. Socially
enforced cooperation, e. g., would be such a control-
ling mechanism. He emphasized that such “tragedies
of the commons” would undermine or at least rela-
tivize the well-known traditional theorem of “the in-
visible hand” after Adam Smith. (The so-called “in-
visible hand” in terms of the market mechanism would
according to the opinion of classical and neoclassical
economists result in such a constellation that the con-
sequences (profit or loss, respectively) would be at-
tributed to the responsible agent and that an optimum
overall result in terms of an optimal equilibrium and
general wealth, i.e., a Pareto optimum would ensue.)
According to Hardin the rational maximizing of each
individual interest need not, via dynamic market pro-
cesses, lead to an optimum result and wealth for all.
On the contrary, it may lead to depletion, erosion and
pollution etc., of the common land. A similar prob-
lem with respect to arable land use also leads to deple-
tion, erosion, even devastation of arable land in large
parts of Africa: the few remaining trees and shrubs are
necessarily used up and/or consumed to satisfy press-
ing survival interests of individual families. This con-
sumption leads to further expansion of the desert and
to an additional deterioration of sustenance and sur-
vival conditions of the whole population etc. (With
respect to stock and the above mentioned traditional
conflict between the individual owners’ interests and
social needs even the boring of additional wells might
indeed aggravate or escalate the conflict constellation
and accelerate the ecological problems. This might be
a well-known unintended side-effect of political and
economic development programs.
A similar effect is the clearing and making arable of
tropical rain forests on basically poor soil which might
lead to local and regional erosion and depletion of the
ecosystem and to a continental or even global change
of the climate (cf. the global carbon dioxide plus
methane problem and the impending glass house ef-
fect of “overheating” the atmosphere as well as the so-
called climate crisis).
Again, also the problem of environmental pollution
turns out to be of analogical or equivalent structure.
The absence of pollution, a public good indeed, is not
diminishing or decreasing in size, but instead a nega-
tive quality is added, namely through the depositing of
refuse of many kinds. Again, it seems more profitable,
i. e. cheaper, for the agent to do away with garbage
on public soil, e. g., to deposit chemical refuse in the
Rhine. As a consequence of these public measures
external social costs would result. Negative external
effects which would amount to a burden for the gen-
eral society; they can only be avoided or redirected if
the taxpayer or everybody pays in money or is suffer-
ing in terms of health disadvantages, deterioration of
quality of life or aesthetic values of ecosystems and the
landscape. Externalities would result from the actions
of producers and consumers whenever these agree on
actions which would be disadvantageous for the envi-
ronment (think of the example of the one-way bottles).
Therefore, there is also a responsibility of consumers,
co-responsibility with respect to the protection of the
environment. On different levels of a scaling phe-
nomenon all members of a society would bear a certain
responsibility for an acceptable or good and healthy
state of their respective society (Kerber, 1988, p. 243).
Generally speaking the same structure is to be found
with many problems of social constellations that may
be dubbed as social trap constellations. It would be
“profitable” for individuals to infringe social rules and
norms as long as (almost) all other members are abid-
ing by them.
A similar structure is to be found in the so-called
Free-Rider Problem and the assurance problem with
respect to providing and maintaining collective and
public goods. Both cases lead to social traps. The
dilemma of environmental protection on a voluntary
basis is an intriguing example of this constellation. The
free-rider problem is “A barrier to successful collective
action or to the production of a public good that arises
because all or some individuals attempt to take a free
ride on the contribution of others. Non-contributors
(would) reason as follows: Either enough others will
contribute to achieve the good or they will not, regard-
less of whether I contribute or not; but if the good is
achieved, I will benefit from it even if I don’t con-
tribute. Consequently, since contributing is a cost, I
should not contribute” (Buchanan, 1985, p. 124).
Likewise, “the assurance problem” is “a barrier to
successful collective action or to the production of a
public good that arises when all or some individuals
decide not to contribute to the good in question be-
cause they lack adequate assurance that enough oth-
ers will contribute” (Buchanan, 1985). The provision
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and maintenance of a collective good is according to
Olson (1968) primarily dependent on the magnitude
of group membership: The greater a group of partic-
ipating individuals, the less the chance and opportu-
nity turn out to be for providing and maintaining such
a good and the greater is the necessity of compulsion,
sanctions etc. with respect to usage and distribution
of collective goods. Whereas community norms or
mores would still seem satisfactory for reaching a com-
mon goal in small groups, this does not apply to large
groups. Buchanan called this phenomenon “the large
number dilemma” (Vanberg, 1982, p. 137).
The structural problems of social and individual ac-
tions, of public goods, and of the commons and social
order can easily be illustrated by using the well-known
game theoretical model of the so-called Prisoners’
Dilemma (PD). A detailed analysis of the PD struc-
ture shows that strategic actions of competing self-
interested rational agents lead to a result which turns
out to be an unintended social consequence putting all
participants on a worse level than a cooperative strat-
egy of abiding by social rules would have obtained.
PD-constellations cannot be solved on a pure individ-
ualistic level.
The above-mentioned dilemmas are at the same time
examples of rationality traps: the individually ratio-
nal action strategy leads to collective social irrational-
ity undermining the first one. Under certain conditions,
individual rationality can be self-destructive.
A second problem of distributing responsibility does
not result just from collective corporate action by itself,
but only if many people act under strategic (competi-
tive) conditions, if negative external, synergistic and/or
cumulative effects occur. Indeed,“strategic condition”
means that the final result is dependent on the (rela-
tively independent) acting of many individual agents.
Synergistic and cumulative effects would only result,
if different components have a joint and mutually es-
calating impact. The individual components might
by themselves be (relatively) harmless, but eventually
they would result in the deterioration, depletion or even
loss of a highly valued common good (think of the ex-
ample of the continental European forest “dying” from
pollution by acid rain and erosion or, recently, micro-
or fine dust by urban car traffic etc.).
3 Extended responsibility and
eco-liability
The distribution problem of responsibility, e. g., con-
sists in the fact that frequently side-effects cannot be
attributed to a single originator and that they usually
were/are or even could not be foreseen or predicted.
We have two partial problems here: First the question
of participatory responsibility with respect to cumu-
lative and synergistic harmful effects and second the
question how to responsibly deal with unforeseen or
even unpredictable facts or side-effects. The first prob-
lem can be called the problem of distributing respon-
sibility under strategic conditions. For instance, is the
legal principle of attributing “causality” and responsi-
bility valid in Japan since the case of the Minamata
disease according to which the statistically assessed
contribution to the common harm by relevant polluters
in the vicinity is ascertained, by law, as the pertain-
ing causality indeed satisfactory? The burden of proof
here lies so to speak on the side of the potential origi-
nator, the polluter, who has to prove the harmlessness
of his emissions. This reversal of the burden of proof
seems to be at least a controllable and operational mea-
sure to allow for attribution wherever environmental
damages are in question. In these detriments usually
land, water and air use or misuse are combined. They
can at least be as a rule forestalled or diminished in
a controllable way by assigning sanctions. In that re-
spect the Japanese legal principle of attributing causal-
ity might foster environmental protection. But there
are methodological and legal as well as moral prob-
lems connected with such a regulation. First of all,
adjacency and the guessing of causality can never be
a proof of a causal origin. In addition, the problem
is how to distribute or attribute the responsibility in
the cases of synergistic and cumulative damages, par-
ticularly those with below-threshold-contributions of
individual agents. Another problem is how to distin-
guish between a descriptive assessment of causal orig-
ination and the normative attribution of responsibility,
between causal responsibility and liability after Hart
(1968). How could one possibly distinguish between
the causal impact, the descriptive responsibility, i.e.
the descriptive attribution of responsibility, and the re-
spective normative attribution of responsibility for con-
tributions – the amount of which is individually inef-
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fective, below the threshold of harmfulness? And how
is one to distribute this kind of responsibility in gen-
eral? Would it not be meaningful to postulate a nor-
mative collective responsibility of all pertinent corpo-
rations within the respective region in the sense of a
joint liability? This would, however, mean a liabil-
ity of all relevant corporations for the total damages.
The impaired parties could sue for damages, claim in
court for compensation and/or indemnification from
any presumably participating corporation. Does this
make sense, if connected with an overall generaliza-
tion? This regulation, however, would have the ad-
vantage of dispensing with the proof of damage in re-
spect of each singular damaging or aggrieving party –
as e. g. a respective norm in German Civil law would
prescribe. This kind of regulation would, in some way
independent of individual case argumentation, inter-
pret all non-collective agents as quasi one corporative
agent being liable in total. The internal distribution
and compensation within this quasi-group of corporate
agents would then be a problem of mutual bargaining
of all aggrieving parties.
Notwithstanding these arguments another kind of to-
tal liability with respect to product safety and hazards
in terms of environmental damages of public goods
should be established. It should be noted that there
is a European Community agreement as of 1985 with
regard to product liability laws. Causal originators of
damages would then/now be liable in the sense of a
strict liability in tort, whether or not they are really
guilty in terms of intent or only negligent. Causal orig-
ination would already ascertain descriptive causal ac-
tion responsibility and with respect to the damage of
a good to be protected also normative responsibility
for the respective action and its consequences. This
form of liability would hopefully be deterrent enough
to prevent infringements. If, however, damages would
nevertheless occur it would at least not be necessary
to prove fault or guiltiness as a presupposition of any
claim for compensation.
Is the human being because of the immense power of
technical encroachment and feasibility beyond any be-
forehand imagination and control responsible for much
more, so to speak, than (s)he could possibly foresee
and literally (intentionally) be normatively responsible
for? Should (s)he not take over responsibility for un-
foreseen or even unforeseeable side-effects of her or
his actions with respect to technological and scientific
big science projects? But how could one possibly do
that? There is no way of really morally being held re-
sponsible for something one does not know or could
not know. In the sense of causal responsibility (taken
descriptively) one can be held responsible in some
sense, even if an unintended damage occurs. The ques-
tion however is, whether one could be held responsible
in a normative-moral sense too. The so-called principle
of causation if interpreted in a moral and legal sense,
would - at least in tendency - adequately design nor-
mative responsibility also. One would have to answer
for, to make good and to be liable for consequences
in the sense of being liable to pay compensation etc.
The range and power of action seems to have multi-
plied to such a degree that anticipation cannot follow
quickly enough or pursue all the complex ramifications
of impacts, consequences and side-effects in complex
interlaced systems. That seems to be an intriguing
dilemma of responsibility in our systems technologi-
cal age impregnated by complex systems interactions
and dynamic changes easily transgressing linear think-
ing and traditional causal disciplinary knowledge. In
principle this also pertains to eco-systems and their re-
spective land bases.
Earlier (Lenk et al., 1998, 439f), I dubbed the distribu-
tion dilemma regarding the using or enjoying a nature
resource or eco-system by different users (e. g. fish-
ermen and anglers, hobby sailors, rowers, swimmers,
naturalists etc. taking advantage of a lake) “the Nat-
uralists’ Dilemma” or “Enjoyers’ Dilemma”. By con-
tradistinction to the PD, this situation can be pragmat-
ically tackled and the problems solved by delimitat-
ing, dividing and distributing spaces and/or times, cer-
tainly, e. g., by mutual agreement.
Technology, technological progress and economic-
industrial development in combination with the respec-
tive damages for land, clean air and water turn out to
be multi-dimensional phenomena asking for interdisci-
plinary and complex approaches. Multi-perspectivity
is the result of an ongoing mutual interaction between
diverse realms and actions of many corporate and in-
dividual agents. This is leading to a rather great com-
plexity of individual, collective and corporate contri-
butions, different areas and social background factors.
The exponential structure of technological develop-
ment in terms of range, energy, acceleration, interac-
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tion feedback phenomena etc. is a familiar insight of
traditional sociology of science, technology and eco-
nomic development. This insight is generally true for
any multi-ramified and interlocked socio-technical or
social phenomena of development.
With regard to responsibility in general, it is not only
corporations and institutions in economics and indus-
try which have to bear responsibility, but also the state
and its representative decision makers. Corporate re-
sponsibility has to be connected with individual re-
sponsibilities of the respective representative decision
makers. This is true also for big technology projects,
particularly if they are run by the state itself. There
should be not only a legal, but also a moral balance of
powers in terms of checks and controls similar to the
traditional distribution of legal powers between legis-
lature, government and jurisdiction.
The upshot of this in terms of moral responsibility
might be formulated like this: The extension of indi-
vidualistic responsibility is to be combined with the de-
velopment of a socially proportionate coresponsibility,
and with the establishment and analytic as well as in-
stitutional elaboration of corporate responsibility and
a new sensitivity of moral conscience. Types of re-
sponsibility have to be analyzed in a more differenti-
ated way than hitherto (see Lenk, 2007, 2015; Lenk,
2016; Lenk, 2017a,b,c,d). Only in this way we may be
able to cope with the most complex structures of causal
networks and the far-ranging consequences of human
actions and social impacts. Concepts for a more so-
cial orientation of responsibility and conscience should
be given most attention. Ethics and moral philosophy
have to take serious these new systemic challenges by
technically multiplied possibilities and impacts of ac-
tion and system networks. An applied ethics of not
only collective, but also of strategic and network ac-
tions as well as their consequences would seem to be
urgently needed indeed in applied sciences - even in
geodesic projects (see, e. g. Heck, 1979; Luo et al.,
2014; Lenk et al., 1994).
References
Buchanan, A. (1985): Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market. Ed. by N. J.
Totowa.
Bunge, M. (1967): Scientific Research. vol. 1,2. Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg, New York.
Gottl-Ottlililienfeld, F. (1923): Wirtschaft und Technik, Tübingen.
Hardin, G. (1968): The Tragedy of the Commons. Science
162:1243–1248.
Hart, H. L. A. (1968): Punishment and Responsibility. 1968.
Heck, B. (1979): Zur lokalen Geoidbestimmung aus terrestrischen
Messungen vertikaler Schweregradienten. Deutsche Geodätische
Kommission, Reihe C, no. 259. Verlag der Bayerischen Akade-
mie der Wissenschaften in Kommission beim Verlag C. H. Beck,
Munich, Germany.
Kerber, W. (1988): Sittlich handeln unter dem Zwang ökonomischer
Sachzwänge. In: Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Ethik. Ed. by H.
Hesse. Berlin, pp. 241–258.
Lenk, H. (1993): Interpretationskonstrukte. Suhrkamp-Verlag,
Frankfurt/M.
Lenk, H. (2007): Global TechnoScience and Responsibilty. LIT,
Berlin.
Lenk, H. (2015): Human-soziale Verantwortung. Projektverlag,
Bochum, Freiburg.
Lenk, H. (2017a): Human - Zwischen Ökoethik und Ökonomik. Pro-
jektverlag, Bochum, Freiburg.
Lenk, H. (2017b): Schemas in Aktion. Projektverlag, Bochum,
Freiburg.
Lenk, H. (2017c): Scheme Dynamics. Projektverlag, Bochum,
Freiburg.
Lenk, H. (2017d): Verantwortlichkeit und Verantwortungstypen. In:
Handbuch Verantwortung. Ed. by L. Heidbrink, C. Langbehn,
and J. Loh. Wiesbaden, pp. 57–84.
Lenk, H., Lenk, U., and Grünreich, D. (1998): Interdisciplinarity and
Interdisciplinary GIS Approaches in Coastal Zone Management
and Floodplain Area Development. In: Environments by Design
2. Kingston:UP, pp. 177–203.
Lenk, H. (2016): Methodological Perspectivism and Scheme-
Interpretationism in Science and Elsewhere. Axiomathes / Epis-
temologia 26(4):383–399. DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9295-1.
Lenk, U., Seitz, K., and Heck, B. (1994): A Datum Defect and Spec-
tral Analysis in Regional Cross-Over Adjustments of Satellite Al-
timeter Data. In: Gravity and Geoid. Joint IGC/ICG Symp. Graz
1994. IAG., vol. 113. Ed. by H. Sünkel and I. Marson. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 357–365.
Luo, X., Mayer, M., Heck, B., and Awange, J. L. (2014): A realistic
and easy-to-implement weighting model for GPS phase obser-
vations. IEEE Transactions on Geosciense and Remote Sensing
52(10):6110–6118. DOI: 10.1109/TGRS.2013.2294946.
Olson, M. (1968): Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns. 1968.
Vanberg, V. (1982): Markt und Organisation. 1982.
177
